Ninja Labz blog

Iran, Russia and the November outages: what the evidence actually supports

A defence analysis report. Iran is highly likely behind the October sabotage of 700 French refrigeration sites; Russia is running sabotage, espionage and influence across Europe; and the American outage week of 12 to 17 November was highly unlikely to be either. Every claim graded on a seven-rung evidence ladder and checked against our own honeynet, graph and press series.

Ninja Labz

Ninja Labz · Defence analysis report · TLP:CLEAR

18 November 2026 · Written for defence and intelligence readers, and the people who brief them

Prepared by
Ninja Labz, the research arm of NinjaIng Ltd
Audience
Defence and intelligence readers; written so a non-specialist can read the summary and stop
Handling
Open sources and Ninja Labz sensor data only. No classified or privileged material. Suitable for onward circulation.
Window
1 October to 18 November 2026 (13:00 UTC data cut)
Probability language
UK PHIA yardstick: remote · highly unlikely · unlikely · realistic possibility · likely · highly likely · almost certain
Companion
A machine-readable dossier (actors, incidents, indicators, sources, each tagged with provenance) accompanies this report
700French retail sites sabotaged by an IRGC unit, 11 to 12 Oct; at least 15 fires
11+European countries hit in the 1 to 2 Nov wave, including British meat suppliers
0US outages of 12 to 17 Nov with any evidence of a cyber attack, out of nine
16 / 54vulnerabilities added to CISA KEV since 1 Oct that sit in edge appliances
9,780source IPs on our honeynet since 5 Oct; Russia 5.2%, Iran 0.9%, all commodity
1,356ransomware victims posted in 30 days (UK 48); the record week was 9 to 15 Nov

Executive summary

The short answer. Iran is behind one recent wave of physical disruption in Europe, and the evidence for that is strong. Russia is behind a steady stream of sabotage, espionage and influence activity across Europe, and the evidence for that is strong in some cases and thin in others. Neither country is behind the run of American technology outages between 12 and 17 November. Every operator involved has given a benign cause, three senior US officials have said there was no cyber attack, and the one public claim to the contrary offers no technical evidence.

Iran. On 9 November France formally attributed the October sabotage of refrigeration systems at about 700 French retail sites to Shahid Kaveh, a unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). That is a government attribution with a published report, named officers, arrest warrants requested and sanctions sought. The attack spoiled food and started at least 15 fires. The same unit is the US government's "CyberAv3ngers", already linked to attacks on American water utilities. A second wave on 1 and 2 November hit stores in at least eleven European countries, including British meat and produce suppliers, and three sites of the French national blood service. That second wave has not been attributed by any government. Belgium says the evidence points to Iran but has stopped short of a formal finding. Two pro-Russian hacktivist brands claimed the second wave, unverified.

Russia. In the window, governments have attributed one physical sabotage plot (Estonia, drone maker Threod Systems, 14 November, GRU) and one cyber attack (Ukraine's Air Alert app, 1 November, attributed by Ukraine). Vendors have attributed three espionage campaigns against NATO defence and government targets (APT28, APT29, Turla) and one election influence operation (Storm-1516). A supply-chain attack on German military drone software is suspected to be Russian, on anonymous sourcing only. None of these caused an outage outside Ukraine. The disruptive Russian activity that does reach Western companies is the Russian-speaking ransomware ecosystem, which is criminal and tolerated rather than directed.

What our own sensors show. Ninja Labz runs a honeynet, a malware range, a threat graph of 1.6 million entities and a daily and weekly intelligence press. None of it shows a state hand in the US outages. It does show the two patterns that matter: internet-exposed industrial controllers with default passwords and end-of-life firmware, and a steady stream of edge-device vulnerabilities being exploited as the entry point for state actors. Sixteen of the 54 vulnerabilities added to the US Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue since 1 October are in firewalls, VPNs, gateways and network appliances.

What to tell a board or a minister. Treat "Iran and Russia are behind the outages" as two separate questions. For the European cold chain: yes, highly likely Iran, with Russian-aligned hacktivists piling on. For the US outage week: highly unlikely; the simpler explanation of change-window failures across unrelated systems fits every fact on record. The lesson is not about Tehran or Moscow. It is that the same unpatched, internet-facing operational technology that a state unit sabotaged in France is sitting in British supermarkets, hospitals and bases today, and that attribution follows the evidence, not the news cycle.

Iran (IRGC Shahid Kaveh) sabotaged French refrigeration systems, 11 to 12 October
highly likelyevidence rung 1 of 7
Government attribution with published report (CERTFR-2026-CTI-009), named individuals, judicial action
Iran was behind the 1 to 2 November second wave across Europe
realistic possibilityevidence rung 4 of 7
No government attribution; Belgium: evidence points to Iran but premature; pro-Russian hacktivists claimed it
Iran or Russia caused the US outages of 12 to 17 November
highly unlikelyevidence rung 7 of 7
Each operator gave a benign cause; DNI, Secretary of State and DHS Secretary said no cyber attack; the only contrary claim cites no evidence
Russia (GRU) ordered sabotage of Estonia's Threod Systems, 14 November
likelyevidence rung 2 of 7
Estonian security service attribution; eight arrests; border closures announced
Russia hijacked Ukraine's Air Alert app, 1 November
likelyevidence rung 2 of 7
Ukrainian government attribution; Ukraine admitted a retaliatory hack of Russia's app
Russian state units ran espionage against NATO defence and government targets
highly likelyevidence rung 3 of 7
Symantec, Sekoia, ESET and Trellix on APT28, APT29 and Turla
Russia was behind the Quantum Systems drone-software supply-chain attack
realistic possibilityevidence rung 6 of 7
Anonymous sources only; company and prosecutors have named no actor
Russia (Storm-1516) ran deepfake influence against US midterm candidates
likelyevidence rung 3 of 7
Graphika high confidence, NewsGuard, Clemson; no US government statement

Bars show the position on the seven-step UK PHIA yardstick, from remote chance (left) to almost certain (right). Rung = where the strongest public evidence sits on the ladder in Section 1.

1. Scope, sources and how to read the grades

This report was commissioned to illustrate the evidence of Iranian and Russian hands behind recent outages and cyber attacks. We have taken that literally: this is a ledger of claims and the evidence for each, not a brief for the prosecution. Where the evidence is strong we say so. Where it is a rumour, a hacktivist boast or a politician's instinct, we say that too. The window is 1 October to 18 November 2026, with the US "outage week" of 12 to 17 November treated as a case study because it is the reason the question is being asked.

Three classes of source were used, and they are kept visibly separate throughout.

  • Open reporting. Government statements and advisories (France's C4 and ANSSI, Belgium, CISA and the FBI, the NCSC, Estonia's KAPO, Ukraine's government), company statements (Microsoft, JPMorgan Chase, United, Apple, the NSA, Quantum Systems), vendor research (Symantec, Sekoia, ESET, SentinelLabs, Check Point, Graphika, NewsGuard) and the press of record (Reuters, the Wall Street Journal, CNN, The Record, BleepingComputer, SecurityWeek). Every statement of fact below carries a numbered source.
  • Ninja Labz sensors and graph. The skunkbox honeynet (Cowrie SSH and Telnet plus OpenCanary on eleven fake services) and malware detonation range on our research VPS; Signal, our Neo4j threat graph (1.6 million entities, 24 feeds, hourly ingest); Fusion's social and press harvest; the ransomware victim tracker; the Daily and Weekly editions our agents write every morning from the same graph. These tell us what is hitting real internet-facing systems and what the open-source world was saying on each day.
  • Our own assessment. Marked as such. We use the UK Professional Head of Intelligence Assessment yardstick because the intended readers use it, and because it forces a choice between "likely" and "highly likely" rather than hiding behind "linked to".

The evidence ladder

Attribution claims arrive in very different weights. We grade each one on this ladder. A claim only gets the top grade when a government has put its name to a published finding that can be examined.

  1. Government attribution with a published technical report Named agency, named unit or individuals, evidence described, judicial or diplomatic action taken. Example: France on Shahid Kaveh, 9 November.
  2. Government statement without a published report A minister or agency says who did it but the evidence stays closed. Example: Estonia on the GRU and Threod Systems; Ukraine on the Air Alert app.
  3. Independent vendor or researcher attribution Named analysts, described tradecraft overlaps, usually with indicators. Weight rises when two or more vendors agree. Example: Symantec, Sekoia and ESET on APT28, APT29 and Sandworm.
  4. Government suspicion on the record but hedged "Evidence points to", "we consider them a suspect". Example: Belgium on Iran; the Pentagon on the commissary freezers.
  5. Claim by the actor or a persona A Telegram video or leak-site post. Weight depends on whether the claimant has ever been caught lying. Example: NoName057(16) and Z-Pentest on the second fridge wave.
  6. Anonymous sourcing in the press "Initial indications suggest", "people familiar with the matter". Example: Russia and Quantum Systems.
  7. Speculation Pattern-matching without evidence, however sincere. Example: the whistleblower letter on the US outages.
A note on our graph numbers. Signal's total node count is dominated by a press-sentiment island built from the GDELT news database. We never quote press volume as threat intelligence; where press and social counts appear in this report they are labelled as what they are, a measure of what people were saying, used only to show when a narrative started and how fast it moved.

2. Case study: the US outage week, 12 to 17 November

Between Thursday 12 and Tuesday 17 November, Americans experienced a cluster of disruptions large enough that the Department of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State each made a public statement about them within a day of each other. The cluster is the reason the Iran and Russia question is being asked, so we take it first and in detail.

2.1 What actually happened

DateOrganisationSectorWhat failedStated causeWho stated itCyber attack?
12 to 14 NovMicrosoft 365Cloud softwareExchange Online, Outlook, Teams, Copilot, Intune; knock-on to Bing, DuckDuckGo and ChatGPT search. Roughly 18 hours to partial recovery, full restoration morning of 14 Nov"A previously undetected defect that caused networking gateway servers to become unresponsive in certain load conditions", exposed by a network configuration change after an updateMicrosoft (Charles Lamanna cause summary, 16 Nov; incident MO1550821)No. "Not caused by a cyberattack or AI agents"1,2
13 NovFederal Aviation AdministrationAviationNationwide ground stop; air traffic control telecommunicationsExcessive data traffic destabilised legacy telecom equipment during router replacement work at a radio site in El Dorado, Arkansas; the FAA has since halted the new router roll-out and switched off units already runningFAA, Transportation Secretary Duffy; FBI asked to assist the reviewNo sign of one; one outlet notes the FAA has not published a final root cause3,4,5
13 to 14 NovWorkdayEnterprise softwareWD1 production tenants placed in maintenanceDisaster-recovery issue left production data inconsistentWorkdayNo3
15 NovAWS US-East-1CloudAuthentication, sign-up and connectivity across 11 servicesNot stated; resolved same dayAWS status pageNone indicated3
16 NovUnited AirlinesAviationDepartures delayed about 100 minutes; crew communications and weight-and-balance applicationsTechnology outageUnited"No sign of a cybersecurity incident"3
16 NovJPMorgan ChaseBankingTransaction delays; Plaid reported intermittent errorsSoftware bug in on-premises hardware systemsJPMorgan ChaseNo cyber link found3,5
17 NovAppleTechnologyiCloud, Apple Pay, Apple SupportInternal updateApple"Not a cyberattack"3
17 NovNational Security AgencyGovernmentNSANet internal network degradedScheduled maintenance; the DNI later said security patches after a PHP vulnerabilityNSA; DNI Jay ClaytonNo; WSJ source: software patching, "no evidence of a cyberattack"3,6,7
12 to 17 NovOpenAI, AnthropicAI servicesSeparate service incidentsService-specific technical problems; demandStatus pagesNone indicated3

Alongside these were several genuine cyber incidents in the same week, none attributed to a state: a ConnectWise ScreenConnect partner-environment intrusion (detected 11 November, 288 hosts across 48 organisations found by Huntress), a supply-chain compromise of the Optimizely web experimentation platform (16 November, 178 organisations, malicious JavaScript served on major news and software sites), Vanderbilt University's loss of OneDrive, SharePoint and Teams (17 November), a server outage at Monadnock Community Hospital in New Hampshire (16 November), and Bitrise taking itself offline after unauthorised access (13 November).3 These are the ordinary crime and supply-chain noise of any week, and they matter here only because they sat next to the outages in the headlines and made the week feel coordinated.

2.2 The attribution claim and the official response

The claim that the outages were an Iranian operation, possibly with Russian support, comes from one source: an open letter posted on X on 17 November by Everett Stern, the former HSBC compliance whistleblower who now runs a private intelligence firm. He wrote that he believes the pattern indicates "an Iranian cyber attack, or a combined operation with Russia supporting Iran", and that "five in five days across aviation, banking, communications, and intelligence is a pattern". The letter presents no technical evidence linking any two incidents, and none identifying Iran or Russia. Its core request is procedural: "Tell the American people what you know, what you do not know, and what you are doing to find out."8

The official response was unusually fast and unusually unanimous.

  • DHS Secretary Markwayne Mullin , 17 November, on Fox News and CNBC: "I can tell you with 98% certainty, we're not seeing a cyberattack." He suggested ageing infrastructure struggling with newer systems, and separately floated an unnamed adviser's theory that artificial intelligence might be overwhelming older systems, for which he offered no evidence and which drew criticism.9,10
  • Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton , 17 November: "no indication that these incidents are the result of a cyberattack, foreign interference, or some coordinated effort." He attributed the NSA disruption to security patches following a PHP vulnerability and said the FBI and NSA had appropriately called for affected systems to be taken offline so fixes could be installed.6,7
  • Secretary of State Marco Rubio : federal officials found "zero evidence" linking the outages to one another or to foreign cybercriminals, nation-states or other malign actors, and "each company has identified specific benign causes".11

Mullin's "98%" is a personal confidence figure, not a measurement, and Stern was right to say that "2 percent is not a rounding error" on national security. But the burden of proof runs the other way. Seven operators have each named a different mundane cause; the claim of a common hidden cause has to explain why a Microsoft gateway defect, an FAA router, a Workday disaster-recovery error, a bank's on-premises software bug and an Apple update would all leave no trace of intrusion in five separate forensic environments. No one has attempted that explanation.

2.3 What our own data say about the week

We cannot see inside Microsoft or the FAA. What we can see is what the world was saying, hour by hour, and what was hitting real internet-facing systems at the same time. Both are relevant, because an attribution narrative that forms before any evidence exists is itself a finding.

Cyber-tagged press headlines containing "outage"…that also contain "Iran", "Russia", "cyberattack" or "hack"
0 5 10 15 20 25 headlines 1 Nov: 0 outage headlines (695 cyber headlines) 1 Nov: 0 outage + attack word (695 cyber headlines) 1 Nov 2 Nov: 0 outage headlines (828 cyber headlines) 2 Nov: 0 outage + attack word (828 cyber headlines) 2 3 Nov: 0 outage headlines (838 cyber headlines) 3 Nov: 0 outage + attack word (838 cyber headlines) 3 4 Nov: 0 outage headlines (973 cyber headlines) 4 Nov: 0 outage + attack word (973 cyber headlines) 4 5 Nov: 0 outage headlines (1026 cyber headlines) 5 Nov: 0 outage + attack word (1026 cyber headlines) 5 6 Nov: 0 outage headlines (945 cyber headlines) 6 Nov: 0 outage + attack word (945 cyber headlines) 6 7 Nov: 0 outage headlines (774 cyber headlines) 7 Nov: 0 outage + attack word (774 cyber headlines) 7 8 Nov: 0 outage headlines (749 cyber headlines) 8 Nov: 0 outage + attack word (749 cyber headlines) 8 9 Nov: 0 outage headlines (994 cyber headlines) 9 Nov: 0 outage + attack word (994 cyber headlines) 9 10 Nov: 0 outage headlines (960 cyber headlines) 10 Nov: 0 outage + attack word (960 cyber headlines) 10 11 Nov: 1 outage headlines (943 cyber headlines) 11 Nov: 1 outage + attack word (943 cyber headlines) 11 12 Nov: 0 outage headlines (816 cyber headlines) 12 Nov: 0 outage + attack word (816 cyber headlines) 12 13 Nov: 14 outage headlines (632 cyber headlines) 14 13 Nov: 9 outage + attack word (632 cyber headlines) 9 13 14 Nov: 2 outage headlines (111 cyber headlines) 14 Nov: 0 outage + attack word (111 cyber headlines) 14 15 Nov: 4 outage headlines (602 cyber headlines) 4 15 Nov: 0 outage + attack word (602 cyber headlines) 15 16 Nov: 3 outage headlines (848 cyber headlines) 3 16 Nov: 2 outage + attack word (848 cyber headlines) 16 17 Nov: 20 outage headlines (934 cyber headlines) 20 17 Nov: 12 outage + attack word (934 cyber headlines) 12 17 18 Nov: 11 outage headlines (228 cyber headlines) 11 18 Nov: 10 outage + attack word (228 cyber headlines) 10 18
Figure 1. The outage narrative in the press, 1 to 18 November. Daily counts of cyber-tagged headlines in Ninja Labz's GDELT and social press harvest. Before 13 November the word "outage" barely appears. It spikes with Microsoft on the 13th, and by the 17th, the day of the whistleblower letter and the three official denials, more than half of the outage headlines pair the word with an attack word. 14 November is a partial ingest day and 18 November runs to 13:00 UTC. Source: Signal graph, SentimentEvent nodes with cyber=true. Press volume, not threat intelligence.
Social posts mentioning "outage"…that also mention Iran, Russia or an attack
0 50 100 150 200 posts 7 Nov: 0 outage headlines (498 cyber headlines) 7 Nov: 0 outage + attack word (498 cyber headlines) 7 Nov 8 Nov: 5 outage headlines (3985 cyber headlines) 8 Nov: 0 outage + attack word (3985 cyber headlines) 8 9 Nov: 1 outage headlines (3697 cyber headlines) 9 Nov: 0 outage + attack word (3697 cyber headlines) 9 10 Nov: 2 outage headlines (3793 cyber headlines) 10 Nov: 0 outage + attack word (3793 cyber headlines) 10 11 Nov: 3 outage headlines (3808 cyber headlines) 11 Nov: 0 outage + attack word (3808 cyber headlines) 11 12 Nov: 21 outage headlines (4076 cyber headlines) 21 12 Nov: 0 outage + attack word (4076 cyber headlines) 12 13 Nov: 182 outage headlines (4158 cyber headlines) 182 13 Nov: 15 outage + attack word (4158 cyber headlines) 13 14 Nov: 38 outage headlines (3901 cyber headlines) 38 14 Nov: 7 outage + attack word (3901 cyber headlines) 14 15 Nov: 18 outage headlines (4103 cyber headlines) 18 15 Nov: 5 outage + attack word (4103 cyber headlines) 15 16 Nov: 38 outage headlines (4393 cyber headlines) 38 16 Nov: 7 outage + attack word (4393 cyber headlines) 16 17 Nov: 86 outage headlines (4469 cyber headlines) 86 17 Nov: 14 outage + attack word (4469 cyber headlines) 17 18 Nov: 12 outage headlines (2145 cyber headlines) 18 Nov: 0 outage + attack word (2145 cyber headlines) 18
Figure 2. Social chatter, 7 to 18 November. Fusion's harvest of Mastodon, Reddit, Bluesky, RSS and Google Trends (about 4,000 items a day). Outage chatter peaks on 13 November at 182 posts, of which 15 also name a state or an attack; the attribution share rises on the 17th. The content of those posts is instructive: most are security professionals saying the opposite of what the headline implies ("Definitely not a cyber attack though", "if it'd been Iran, they'd be senate hearings"). One widely reposted item correctly paired the Microsoft outage with an unrelated Outlook vulnerability (CVE-2026-124194) added to KEV days earlier, which is how coincidence becomes narrative. Source: Fusion graph, SocialPost nodes.

Our Daily, which is written each morning by an agent that reads the previous 24 hours of the graph and is forbidden from making claims its sources do not make, covered the FAA stop on 14 November and on the 15th led the story with "The FAA outage looks like a software update, which nobody wants it to be", noting that "officials say there is no evidence of a cyberattack" and that practitioner reporting pointed at an update on the private communications network operated by L3Harris. The same edition's aside is worth quoting to a defence audience because it is the methodological point of this whole section: "Our industry has trained itself to read every outage as an attack, which is a kind of professional vanity: sometimes a change window simply ate a network, and the correct response is to be slightly bored."

On the sensor side, nothing changed. The honeynet saw the same commodity scanning on 12 to 17 November that it sees every day (Section 5). Our edge logs, run through the Adversary DNA fingerprinting engine, show 48 hostile sources in the current window, dominated by cloud-hosted "researcher" scanners, with no change in archetype mix during the outage week. Our public DEFCON brief for 18 November, which ranks newly exploited vulnerabilities by exposure, led with GitLab, Atlassian, Citrix, Cisco and PaperCut flaws, none of them connected to any of the outages.

2.4 Assessment

It is highly unlikely that Iran, Russia or any other state caused the US outages of 12 to 17 November. Each incident has a stated, specific and mundane cause from the operator that experienced it; the three most senior US officials with visibility have said there is no indication of a cyber attack or coordination; and the only public claim of state involvement is explicitly a request for investigation, not a finding. Two caveats keep this short of "almost certain": the FAA has not yet published a final root-cause statement, and Microsoft's full post-incident report is still pending. If either document were to describe tampering, this assessment would change. Nothing in the public record or in our own data suggests it will.

The week does teach something about Iran and Russia, though indirectly. Both have an interest in Americans believing their infrastructure is under attack, and both run influence operations designed to produce exactly that belief (Section 4.4). A week in which a quarter of US outage headlines carry an attack word, with no attack, is a free gift to those operations. Defenders should plan for the narrative as well as the intrusion.

3. Iran: the cold-chain sabotage campaign and its relatives

If the question has a "yes" answer, it is here. Between 11 October and 18 November, Iranian state actors were formally attributed for a campaign that physically damaged commercial infrastructure in a NATO country, and the same tradecraft reached British businesses, French blood banks and, on current suspicion, American military commissaries. This section sets out the timeline, the technical mechanism, the evidence France has disclosed, the parts that remain unproven, and the wider Iranian pattern it fits.

3.1 Context: a country at war

Iran has been at war with Israel and the United States since coordinated airstrikes on 28 February 2026. A memorandum signed in Islamabad in mid-June opened a 60-day negotiating window; the ceasefire collapsed on 8 July after Iranian attacks on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, the memorandum's window lapsed in mid-August, and as of mid-November talks are stalled behind a US naval blockade and seven Iranian preconditions.12,13 The cyber dimension of the war has included Iranian drone strikes on three AWS data centres in the UAE in early March (a kinetic cause of a regional cloud outage), a significant Iranian cyber attack on a US medical supply company, and a summer campaign against US water utilities.14 This matters for attribution because motive and permission are not in doubt: Iran has every reason to hurt Western economies and has shown it will accept physical consequences.

3.2 Timeline of the refrigeration campaign

  • France, wave one. Overnight, attackers alter defrost cycles and temperature setpoints on internet-exposed refrigeration controllers at about 700 retail sites: large chains, butchers, a slaughterhouse and cooperative food-processing plants. Extensive food losses; at least 15 fires. ANSSI later says the same actors simultaneously targeted Schneider Electric equipment at several small hydroelectric plants, with moderate disruption.15,16
  • Europe, wave two. More than 100 stores in Belgium, Sweden, the Netherlands, Ireland, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and others. Victims include British meat suppliers and a fruit and vegetable wholesaler, and three sites of France's national blood service, whose storage refrigeration was disrupted. Our Daily carried the first story on 3 November and the second wave on the 4th.17,18,19
  • Hacktivist claim. NoName057(16) and Z-Pentest, two pro-Russian hacktivist brands, post a video claiming joint responsibility for heating fridges to about 50°C and release a sample of more than 2,500 credentials they say belong to Danfoss staff and customers. The posts are later deleted; nothing is independently verified.20
  • US warning. CISA, the FBI, HHS, USDA and DOT issue a joint statement that attackers are targeting and compromising internet-connected refrigeration and cold-chain monitoring systems "across critical infrastructure sectors globally" (FBI Cyber Branch operations director Brett Leatherman). Danfoss confirms some targeted systems in the Netherlands were on unsecured networks with default passwords. US agencies do not say whether US sites were hit.21
  • French attribution. France's Cyber Crisis Coordination Centre (C4: ANSSI, military cyber command, DGSE and DGSI) publishes a five-page report, CERTFR-2026-CTI-009, attributing wave one to Shahid Kaveh, a unit of the IRGC Electronic and Cyber Centre. The annex names Hamid Reza Lashgarian (head of the centre) and Mahdi Lashgarian and Reza Salarvand as Shahid Kaveh commanders. Paris prosecutors open a judicial investigation and request international arrest warrants; Foreign Minister Barrot summons Iran's ambassador and says France will seek EU sanctions. Iran calls the allegations "baseless and malicious".15,16,22
  • Private US corroboration. Reuters reports that Microsoft had privately tied Iran to the October sabotage at least two weeks earlier; Secretary Rubio says France's finding "doesn't surprise us".23
  • Belgium. Interior Minister Bernard Quintin: "according to reliable evidence obtained by our agencies, Iran could potentially be behind the attacks", with the federal prosecutor investigating. Foreign Minister Prévot says formal attribution would be premature.24
  • The controllers are still open. Midnight Blue discloses six unpatched flaws in Danfoss AK-SM800A controllers allowing remote takeover without login, newest firmware included; VulnCheck reports hackers probing newly disclosed Copeland controller flaws. CVE assignments pending. Our Daily on the 18th: "The cold chain has six unpatched flaws and no login requirement."25

3.3 The technical mechanism

Nothing about the attack was sophisticated, which is the point. Commercial refrigeration in supermarkets and cold stores is managed by small controllers from a handful of vendors, principally Danfoss (AK-SM 800A series) and Copeland (Dixell XWEB PRO and related lines), each with a web interface so facilities staff can monitor temperatures and adjust defrost cycles remotely. Tens of thousands of these interfaces are reachable from the public internet, often through a refrigeration contractor's remote-support arrangement rather than the retailer's own IT. Many run end-of-life firmware, and many still carry default credentials.21,26

The attackers logged in or exploited authentication bypasses, then changed setpoints and forced defrost cycles. Freezers at minus 27°C were pushed above 50°C, which spoils stock, overloads compressors and in at least 15 French cases started fires.16,22 Vulnerabilities cited in the open-source pulses our graph ingested for this campaign include CVE-2025-41450 (Danfoss AK-SM 8xxA authentication bypass, CVSS 8.2), CVE-2023-45208, -45209 and -45210, CVE-2021-38459, -38460 and -38461, and for the Copeland line CVE-2026-25085.27 A separate research team found exposed XWEB PRO controllers being used as an SMTP spam botnet and residential-proxy exit, which shows how routinely this equipment is already compromised by criminals.28 The six new Danfoss flaws disclosed on 17 November have no patch.

In other words the campaign required: an internet scanner, a list of default passwords, a working knowledge of the controller's web interface, and the intent to cause physical harm. The first three are available to any hacktivist crew. The fourth, at scale and in a single coordinated night across 700 sites, is what France attributes to a state unit.

3.4 The evidence France disclosed, and what it did not

France's report is a government attribution with a published document and judicial follow-through, the top rung of our ladder. The evidence described publicly is of three kinds: Farsi-language artefacts left in the intrusions; tooling and infrastructure overlapping with reconnaissance the same unit had run against other industrial equipment; and, for a related operation by the sister unit Shahid Shoostari (the 2024 Paris Olympics advertising-screen hijack), Persian-language social accounts and connections from two Iranian ISP addresses.15,16 Press summaries also cite "IP addresses in Iran".22 The report does not, as far as public reporting shows, publish indicators, and it does not address wave two.

Shahid Kaveh is not a new name. The US Treasury and the FBI have identified it as the unit behind the "CyberAv3ngers" persona that defaced Unitronics programmable logic controllers at US water utilities in 2023, and US rewards of up to $10 million stand for six IRGC officials including both Lashgarians.16 CISA's April 2026 advisory AA26-097A, updated in July, describes Iranian-affiliated actors targeting PLCs across US critical infrastructure, and CISA revealed that more than 100 US water systems were targeted in July 2026, with federal investigators suspecting Iran but declining formal attribution.29,30 The French finding therefore lands on a well-documented pattern: an IRGC unit whose signature is the manipulation of small, internet-exposed operational technology for visible, physical effect.

Three things remain genuinely open, and a careful reader should hold them open:

  1. Wave two is unattributed. No government has attributed the 1 to 2 November attacks. Belgium's evidence "points to" Iran; two pro-Russian hacktivist brands claimed them with a credential dump that no one has verified. The hacktivist claim is weak evidence, since these brands routinely claim others' work, but it is not nothing: Z-Pentest, formed in 2024 from NoName057(16) and CARR members, has a documented record of attacking exposed OT and claimed ten refrigeration attacks on a single day in April 2026.20 The honest reading is that the same open doors were walked through by more than one actor, which is exactly what happens when a technique is demonstrated at scale.
  2. Expert dissent exists. At least one UK security commentator has said publicly that "there is no evidence factual or anecdotal that points to Iran being the culprit".31 That is overstated given the French report, but it reflects the fact that France has published a finding, not its forensic evidence.
  3. The US cases are suspicion, not finding. The August refrigeration failures at between six and fourteen US military commissaries are under investigation by the Defense Criminal Investigative Service and Army CID's Cyber Field Office. Two former officials told reporters investigators treat them as a cyber attack with evidence pointing to Iran "though not high confidence"; the Pentagon has confirmed only that it is "aware of speculation". Reuters could not establish any link between the commissary incidents, the French campaign and wave two.32,33

3.5 Other Iranian activity in the window

  • Blinder Tunnel (7 October, Signal graph). An Iranian state-aligned actor masquerading as the Dubai Airports IT department delivered trojanised coding challenges to targets in Iraqi critical infrastructure. Espionage access, not disruption; a reminder that the Gulf and Iraq remain the primary theatre.27
  • Handala (Israel). The Ministry of Intelligence-linked persona claimed 87 incidents against Israel between 1 and 22 October (Check Point count), mostly DDoS and defacement, plus a leak from the retailer Max Shop, an attack on the security provider AGAS, and leaflet drops in Tel Aviv on 9 November that Israeli police are investigating.34
  • MuddyWater. Continues to appear in our campaign feed (RustyWater implant, "Snakes by the riverbank", Operation Olalampo earlier in the year); no new disruptive activity in the window.
  • Shipping pre-positioning. Microsoft's 2026 Digital Defense Report describes three Iranian state-affiliated actors attacking shipping and logistics firms in Europe and the Gulf in a pattern Microsoft reads as pre-positioning.35
  • UK. The NCSC Annual Review published on 3 November says Iran-linked groups "continue to demonstrate how cyber operations can create indiscriminate disruption at scale", and NCSC chief executive Richard Horne said Iran is still carrying out malicious cyber operations globally, including against the UK and individuals seen as a threat to the regime.36

3.6 Assessment

It is highly likely that the IRGC's Shahid Kaveh unit conducted the 11 to 12 October sabotage of French refrigeration systems, and likely that the same unit was responsible for the simultaneous probing of small French hydroelectric plants. It is a realistic possibility that Iranian actors conducted or seeded the 1 to 2 November wave, with pro-Russian hacktivists either participating or claiming credit; we cannot separate the two on public evidence and neither can Belgium. It is a realistic possibility that the August US commissary failures were Iranian, pending the Pentagon investigation. The campaign as a whole is the clearest case in 2026 of a state actor causing physical damage in NATO territory by cyber means, and the clearest demonstration that the target set is not "critical infrastructure" as governments define it but any internet-connected machine that can be made to do harm.

4. Russia: sabotage, espionage, influence, and a ransomware economy

Russia's activity in the window is broader than Iran's and less tied to outages. It falls into five streams, which we take in descending order of evidence quality. The common thread for a Western reader is that Russian destructive cyber operations remain concentrated on Ukraine, while the reach into NATO Europe is physical sabotage, espionage and narrative.

4.1 Physical sabotage attributed to the GRU

On 14 November Estonia's Internal Security Service said Russia's GRU had ordered an attempted arson and explosion at the drone manufacturer Threod Systems in Viimsi, north of Tallinn, and detained eight Latvian citizens who tried to break into the company's property. Prime Minister Kristen Michal called it part of "Russia's hybrid war against Europe" and announced the closure of Estonia's three remaining road crossings with Russia from 1 December.37,38 At the EU foreign ministers' meeting on 16 November, Estonia's Margus Tsahkna said the attempt "is yet another reminder that Russia's hostile activities extend far beyond Ukraine"; Romania's Dan Neculăescu reported four alerts in 24 hours and three ships hit by drones near the Sulina Canal over the same weekend; Sweden's Maria Malmer Stenergard said the incidents reflect Kremlin frustration at "not winning in Ukraine".39 These are kinetic and physical, not cyber, but they set the risk appetite against which Russian cyber activity should be read, and they are what European ministers mean when they speak of Russian "attacks" this month.

The UK's position is on the record in the NCSC Annual Review of 3 November: Russia is "the most daring" threat; in July the NCSC and 18 partners attributed a December 2025 attack on Poland's energy grid to FSB Centre 16 and exposed the same unit's exploitation of vulnerable routers against critical national infrastructure worldwide, with 24 individuals and entities sanctioned.36 That grid attack is the one recent Russian cyber operation with an outage-class effect in a NATO state, and it sits just outside our window.

4.2 Cyber operations in and around Ukraine

  • A Russian-speaking operator targets Ukraine's state data-exchange system through Log4Shell in a Graylog instance (OTX pulse in Signal). Old vulnerability, new victim.27
  • MythicRatatoskr. An Yggdrasil-enabled backdoor deployed in what researchers describe as a UAC-0099 and Sandworm collaboration, following a wiper deployment after UAC-0099 access. ESET's half-year report on 28 October covered Sandworm, Gamaredon and UAC-0099.27,40
  • Belarus-linked hackers deploy wiper malware in what the reporting calls the first documented destructive attack by that group on Ukraine.27
  • Air Alert app. Ukraine's civil air-raid warning app pushes false nuclear and chemical attack warnings; the Ukrainian government attributes the hijack to Russia. The same night Russia's Emergencies Ministry app sends fake messages that nuclear warheads have been launched; Russia calls it a "massive cyberattack". President Zelensky later tells PBS the Russian app hack was Ukrainian retaliation: "We only respond on their attacks." Ukraine's Air Force says the Air Alert app is not connected to military command systems.41,42 Our Daily covered both apps on 4 November.
  • Gorbag. "Orcs at the border": an intelligence-harvesting campaign against Ukraine documented in our campaign feed.27
  • Ukrainian newsroom takeovers described as suspected Russian; no government attribution.43

The Air Alert case is the one Russian cyber attack in the window that produced an outage-like public effect, and its attribution comes from the victim government (ladder rung 2) with the unusual corroboration that the victim then admitted doing the same thing back. It is likely Russian. Note also that the Kyiv blackouts of late October and early November, which pushed Ukrainian cities to 23 hours a day without power, were missile and drone strikes, not cyber; press headlines that paired "Russia" and "darkness" that week were about kinetic attacks on the grid.

4.3 Espionage against NATO governments and defence industry

Three independent vendor attributions in the window describe Russian state units working against exactly the readership of this report.

  • APT28 (GRU Unit 26165; Symantec's "Swallowtail", Microsoft's Forest Blizzard). Symantec's 20 October report describes HOOKEDGE intrusions at a law-enforcement agency, a naval shipbuilder and an aircraft-engine manufacturer in two NATO countries, delivered through malicious Word documents. AhnLab's October review independently records APT28 targeting law enforcement and defence contractors in NATO states. Trellix's November report adds APT28, Turla and Laundry Bear exploitation of Zimbra mail servers.44,45
  • APT29 (SVR; "Poisoned Source"). Sekoia's 4 November report describes a large watering-hole campaign using compromised legitimate sites, adversary-in-the-middle impersonation of high-profile domains, and a supply-chain compromise of the Ukrainian analytics service Plerdy SEO Tracker to deliver iOS and Android exploit chains to thousands of mobile users. Our Daily carried it on 5 and 6 November.46
  • Turla (FSB Centre 16). Named in ten separate articles collected by our graph in the week to 13 November, which made it our Weekly's Actor of the Week with 51 ATT&CK techniques on file. Romania's intelligence service has an active investigation into Turla campaigns against a public institution; the Russian embassy in Bucharest denies involvement.47
  • Static Tundra / FSB Centre 16. A Mastodon item in our harvest on 31 October summarised the FSB's technique of stealing Cisco router configurations with a single SNMP Set-Request, "no exploit needed", with nine detections and five indicators published. This is the same unit and the same edge-device tradecraft the NCSC attributed for the Polish grid.36

Taken together these make it highly likely that Russian state units ran active espionage against NATO defence, law-enforcement and government targets throughout the window. None of it caused an outage. All of it is the access that a future outage would be built on.

4.4 Influence operations

Storm-1516, the Russian network previously documented by Microsoft and Recorded Future, produced AI-generated videos targeting US midterm candidates from about 20 October, including a fabricated assault allegation against a Texas Senate candidate and fakes aimed at an Ohio candidate. Graphika assessed "with high confidence" that Storm-1516 produced the videos; NewsGuard matched the format and amplification pattern; Clemson researchers concurred. The videos reused real people's identities with AI face-swaps and were amplified about twelve hours after posting by large X accounts that had previously carried Storm-1516 narratives. The US government has said nothing publicly.48,49 It is likely Russian. This is the stream most relevant to Section 2: a network that manufactures belief in American institutional failure had a very good week when American institutions failed on their own.

4.5 Suspected: the Quantum Systems supply-chain attack

The German drone maker Quantum Systems, a supplier to Ukraine and the Bundeswehr, confirmed that attackers placed a malicious update on its distribution server for QBase, the ground-control software for its Vector drones, in late October. The poisoned update reached Bundeswehr servers and other customers but did not infect aircraft; the Bundeswehr grounded its Vector fleet as a precaution and returned it to service on 12 November. Der Spiegel and the Financial Times reported that "initial indications suggested Russia" from unnamed sources; Bamberg prosecutors are investigating persons unknown; the company has named no actor.50,51 On the ladder this is rung 6. It is a realistic possibility that Russia was responsible, and the technique (an update server as a weapons system) is the one that should worry every defence supplier reading this.

4.6 The Russian-speaking ransomware economy

The Russian activity that most reliably causes outages in Western organisations is not state-directed at all. Our ransomware tracker recorded 1,356 victims posted to leak sites in the 30 days to 18 November, of which 552 were in the United States and 48 in the United Kingdom. The weekly series has climbed from 148 in the first week of September to 369 in the week of 9 to 15 November, the highest of the year.

0 100 200 300 400 victims W36: 148 victims posted W36 148 W37: 175 victims posted W37 W38: 211 victims posted W38 W39: 180 victims posted W39 W40: 233 victims posted W40 W41: 234 victims posted W41 W42: 323 victims posted W42 323 W43: 223 victims posted W43 W44: 276 victims posted W44 W45: 280 victims posted W45 W46: 369 victims posted W46 369 W47*: 176 victims posted W47* 176
Figure 3. Ransomware victims posted to leak sites per ISO week, September to November 2026. Week 47 covers 16 to 18 November only. Source: Signal ransomware tracker (ransomlook.io and our own Tor crawl of 36 crew leak sites, deduplicated). Posting counts measure extortion announcements, not confirmed intrusions, and lag the intrusion by days to weeks.
GroupVictims, 30 daysUK victimsOur origin note
Qilin1279Russian-speaking RaaS; ESXi-focused (ESET, 28 Oct)
The Gentlemen1186New RaaS, profiled 5 and 21 Oct
INC Ransom721Russian-speaking
Akira390Russian-speaking; Conti lineage
Booba Project / SilentRansomGroup / PixelLeaks39 / 37 / 321 / 1 / 0New brands, origin unestablished
Rhysida / Play / LockBit 522 / 19 / 151 / 1 / 0Russian-speaking; LockBit sanctioned (Op Cronos)

Sectors in the 30 days: manufacturing 187, professional services 147, healthcare 144, technology 137, retail 110, financial services 73, education 51, transport 40, government and defence 38, energy and utilities 35. The relationship between this economy and the Russian state is permissive rather than directive: crews operate from Russian jurisdiction without arrest provided they avoid domestic targets, several (Conti, LockBit, REvil, DarkSide) have been sanctioned, and the state borrows their access and tooling when convenient. For an outage-focused reader the distinction matters: a hospital taken down by Qilin is a Russian-origin outage, but it is not evidence of a Russian operation.

4.7 Assessment

Russia in the window is highly likely to have run espionage against NATO defence and government targets (vendor-attributed, multiply corroborated), likely to have ordered the Threod sabotage (government-attributed) and the Air Alert hijack (victim-government attributed), likely to be behind Storm-1516's deepfakes (researcher-attributed), and a realistic possibility as the author of the Quantum Systems supply-chain attack (anonymous sourcing). It is highly unlikely that Russia caused any of the US outages of 12 to 17 November, for the reasons in Section 2.

5. What Ninja Labz's own sensors and graph show

Everything above is open reporting graded on the ladder. This section is what we can measure ourselves. It has two purposes. First, to show a defence or intelligence reader what an independent sensor estate sees while the headlines run, which is a useful corrective. Second, to be honest about what such an estate cannot see.

5.1 The honeynet

9,780
unique source IPs, 5 Oct to 18 Nov
skunkbox Cowrie + OpenCanary
119,180
SSH and Telnet sessions (Cowrie)
8,632 IPs
1.06M
fake-service events, 11 to 18 Nov (OpenCanary)
1,233 IPs; MSSQL, VNC, RDP dominate
26%
of sources flagged as hosting or data-centre space
ip-api hosting flag
510
Russian-geolocated IPs (5.2%)
3,110 sessions
86
Iranian-geolocated IPs (0.9%)
197 sessions
Other countriesRussia and Iran
United States: 1,319 unique source IPs United States 1,319 China: 1,129 unique source IPs China 1,129 South Korea: 557 unique source IPs South Korea 557 Russia: 510 unique source IPs Russia 510 Brazil: 379 unique source IPs Brazil 379 India: 367 unique source IPs India 367 Ukraine: 363 unique source IPs Ukraine 363 Pakistan: 346 unique source IPs Pakistan 346 Hong Kong: 234 unique source IPs Hong Kong 234 United Kingdom: 205 unique source IPs United Kingdom 205 Argentina: 193 unique source IPs Argentina 193 Germany: 192 unique source IPs Germany 192 Iran: 86 unique source IPs Iran 86
Figure 4. Honeynet unique source IPs by country of geolocation, 5 October to 18 November. Top twelve plus Iran. Geolocation is of the connecting address, not the operator; a quarter of all sources are rented hosting. Source: skunkbox Cowrie session logs and OpenCanary event logs, public addresses only, geolocated with ip-api.

The honeynet is a commodity-attack instrument, and it says so. Session volume is dominated by a handful of brute-forcers: a Microsoft Azure address in the Netherlands (25,991 sessions), a hosting address in Andorra (14,151) and two in a US hosting range. Credentials tried are the Mirai and IoT catalogue (admin/admin, support/support, ubnt/ubnt, root/vizxv). Of the Russian sources, the two most active sit in AS198953 Proton66, a bulletproof hoster well documented as infrastructure for crime, followed by consumer ranges at MegaFon, MTS and TATTELECOM. The Iranian sources are almost all AS58224 Iran Telecommunication Company consumer space; one address made 1,780 fake-service probes in the week. None of this is state activity. State units do not announce themselves to honeypots from home ISP ranges, and if one of these addresses were ever used operationally it would be as a disposable proxy. The value of the sensor here is negative evidence: during the US outage week the attack surface looked exactly as it did the week before.

5.2 The malware range

The detonation cell has processed 415 samples caught by the honeypot since 15 November (202 ELF binaries, 44 dropper scripts, two planted SSH keys) and detonated 196 of them in a no-egress cell with a sinkhole that records every connection the sample tries to make. Every binary family identified so far is Mirai or Gafgyt, the botnet lineage that has been scanning Telnet since 2016; architectures are ARM (132), x86 and x86-64, MIPS and a handful of others. The first command-and-control endpoint extracted, from a Gafgyt variant, was a hosting address on an unusual port (25565, the Minecraft default) with 127 connection attempts in 60 seconds. The Deep Scan assistant's first live turn on a Mirai sample found the four-byte handshake in the sinkhole log and cited the field it came from. This is relevant to the question only as calibration: the overwhelming majority of what reaches an exposed system is automated criminal infrastructure, and a cold-chain controller on the public internet is being hit by it every hour whether or not a state unit is also interested.

5.3 The threat graph

Signal holds 185 STIX-sourced threat actors, 84 of them with a tagged country of origin: China 42, Russia 20, Iran 12, North Korea 7, with single entries for Belarus, Israel and Cambodia. The Russian set includes Sandworm Team, APT28, APT29, Turla, Gamaredon, Dragonfly, Ember Bear, Indrik Spider, Wizard Spider, UAC-0099, UAC-0145, Laundry Bear and the criminal brands Ryuk, BlackCat, REvil and Cl0p. The Iranian set includes OilRig, APT33, APT42, Magic Hound, MuddyWater, Fox Kitten, Agrius, Moses Staff, CURIUM and Leafminer. Since 1 October the graph has ingested 283 campaign reports; the Iran- and Russia-relevant ones are the backbone of Sections 3 and 4 and are listed in the dossier that accompanies this report.

The campaign pulse for the European refrigeration sabotage, ingested on 13 November, is tagged simultaneously irgc, noname057(16) and z-pentest, with default credentials, internet-exposed devices and the eight CVEs listed in Section 3.3. That single record captures the whole attribution problem: a state unit, two hacktivist brands and a decade of unpatched controllers in one incident.

The weekly Actor of the Week series is a crude but honest measure of which state units the open-source world was writing about: TraderTraitor (North Korea) in the week to 6 November, Turla (Russia) in the week to 13 November, each named in ten separate collected articles. The all-time tradecraft table in the same editions ranks APT28 at 73 ATT&CK techniques on file, Sandworm 64, OilRig 59, Magic Hound 59, Gamaredon 56, Turla 51. Breadth of catalogue is not current activity, and the Weekly says so.

5.4 Exploited vulnerabilities as a state-actor indicator

Fifty-four vulnerabilities were added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue between 1 October and 18 November. Sixteen are in network edge and security appliances, the class of device that the NCSC, Amazon's threat intelligence team and the FSB Centre 16 advisory all identify as the preferred entry point for Russian state operators, and that CISA's water-sector advisories identify for Iranian ones.36,52

AddedProductWeaknessWhy it matters
1 OctFortinet FortiMailPath traversalMail gateway
4 OctCitrix NetScaler ADC and GatewayMemory bufferRemote-access gateway; prior CitrixBleed history
8 OctJuniper Junos (ISC BIND component)DoSRouter and DNS
13 OctIvanti Connect SecureAuthentication bypass by spoofingVPN appliance; also 30 Oct ×2 (missing authentication, predictable identifiers)
14 OctPalo Alto PAN-OSCode injection in management interfaceFirewall
14 OctCisco Secure Email Gateway (AsyncOS)Path traversalMail gateway
16 OctFortinet FortiOSPath traversalFirewall and VPN
16 OctBeyondTrust Remote SupportAuthentication bypassPrivileged remote access
23 OctArista VeloCloud OrchestratorSQL injectionSD-WAN control plane
29 OctCisco ASA and FTDNull pointer dereference in Remote Access SSL VPNFirewall and VPN
6 NovSonicWall SonicOS SSLVPNSingle-factor authentication enforcementVPN; MFA bypass
10 NovBarracuda Email Security Gateway (×2)Command injection; authentication bypassMail gateway; prior Chinese-state exploitation history
10 NovCisco BroadWorksXML external entityCarrier voice platform
13 NovCheck Point Gaia OSIncorrect permission on root socket (CVE-2026-123039)Firewall; used with PHP2Shell in destructive attacks, see below

One of these deserves a paragraph because it is the only destructive edge-device campaign in the window and because it shows how attribution can be wrong in both directions. Between 30 October and 4 November attackers exploited the PHP2Shell vulnerability through Check Point gateways' Mobile Access portal, used the Gaia root flaw to escalate, deployed a backdoor named TSGA, and then wiped internal VMware ESXi hosts, leaving a note branded with the name of an Israeli security company. Check Point says a couple of dozen unpatched systems in one region were hit. Analysts lean towards a China-nexus actor because of tooling overlaps, but the destructive effect does not match Chinese practice and Check Point itself says the destruction may have been cover for another goal.53 Neither Iran nor Russia is seriously suggested. A reader who assumed "wiper plus ESXi plus Israeli brand" meant Iran would have been wrong, and the case is a useful control for the rest of this report.

5.5 What our sensors cannot tell you

Honesty about limits is part of the method. Our honeynet sees opportunistic scanning; a state unit using a compromised router in the target's own country would not appear in it. Our graph ingests what vendors and governments publish, so it inherits their lag and their biases. Our press and chatter series measure attention, not truth. Our gang-voice corpus from the dark-web crawl was not re-queried for this cut because of an authentication lockout on the research graph during the data pull; from prior reads it contains extortion and recruitment language, not geopolitics, and we would not expect it to bear on state attribution. And we have no access to the forensic evidence held by France, Belgium, the Pentagon or Microsoft; our grades are grades of the public record.

6. State-level indicators and technique: what to look for

The second question put to us was about the technology. This section distils the window into the indicators and techniques that distinguish state activity from the criminal background, with the caveat that none of them is diagnostic on its own.

6.1 Techniques that recurred

TechniqueSeen inActorDetection and defence hint
Manipulation of internet-exposed OT controllers (setpoint and defrost changes) for physical effectFrench refrigeration, European wave two, US commissaries (suspected), Schneider hydro plants, 2023 to 2026 water PLCsIRGC Shahid Kaveh; hacktivistsAny refrigeration, HVAC or PLC web interface reachable from the internet is a finding; look for logins from new geographies and setpoint changes outside maintenance windows; inventory contractor remote-access paths
Edge-device exploitation as initial access (VPN, firewall, mail gateway, router)16 KEV additions; FSB Centre 16 router config theft via SNMP; Check Point PHP2ShellRussian FSB and GRU; Chinese; criminalPatch cadence on appliances measured in days; SNMP write community strings; management interfaces off the internet; configuration-change alerting
Supply-chain compromise of an update serverQuantum Systems QBase; Plerdy analytics script (APT29); Optimizely (criminal)Suspected Russia; SVR; criminalSigned updates with pinned keys; staged rollout; egress monitoring on ground-control and build systems
Watering holes delivering mobile exploit chainsAPT29 Poisoned SourceSVRMobile device management with rapid OS patching; lockdown mode for high-value staff; monitor for adversary-in-the-middle domain impersonation
Hijack of civilian alerting apps for panic effectUkraine Air Alert; Russia Emergencies Ministry appRussia; UkraineTreat public-warning channels as critical infrastructure; signing of alert payloads; out-of-band verification
Destructive wiper via edge footholdCheck Point gateways to ESXiUnattributed (China-leaning)ESXi management isolation; immutable backups; monitor for new SSH keys and TSGA-style implants on gateways
AI-generated video with identity theft of real people, amplified by seasoned accountsStorm-1516 midtermsRussiaNarrative monitoring; provenance checks; pre-bunking during outages
Hacktivist claim-jumping on real incidentsNoName057(16) and Z-Pentest on fridges; Handala in IsraelPro-Russian; pro-IranianGrade claims on the ladder; a credential dump is not proof of the intrusion that caused the effect

6.2 Indicators by family

  • Vulnerabilities associated with the cold-chain campaign: CVE-2025-41450 (Danfoss AK-SM 8xxA, authentication bypass), CVE-2023-45208, CVE-2023-45209, CVE-2023-45210, CVE-2021-38459, CVE-2021-38460, CVE-2021-38461 (Danfoss), CVE-2026-25085 (Copeland/Dixell XWEB PRO). Six further Danfoss flaws (Midnight Blue, 17 November) and fourteen Copeland flaws (VulnCheck) await CVE assignment. CISA advisory ICSA-25-140-03 covers the AK-SM series.
  • Edge-device vulnerabilities in KEV, 1 October to 18 November: the sixteen entries in Section 5.4, with the Check Point chain (PHP2Shell plus CVE-2026-123039) the only one with a confirmed destructive follow-on.
  • Vulnerabilities our social harvest heard about most in the window: CVE-2026-123158 (32 mentions from 8 November), CVE-2026-114938 (28, from 17 November), CVE-2026-119618 (27), CVE-2026-124194 (Outlook, 24; the one that got entangled with the Microsoft outage narrative), CVE-2026-125350 (22), CVE-2026-109618 and -109619 (the PHP pair, 20 and 15), CVE-2026-123039 (Check Point, 16), CVE-2026-19868 (SonicWall, 11). Early chatter is a leading indicator of exploitation, with the usual caveat that our own measured lead over KEV is about a third of cases, typically days.
  • Named units and personas: Shahid Kaveh (CyberAv3ngers, Cyber Isnaad Front) and Shahid Shoostari (Emennet Pasargad, Cotton Sandstorm) under the IRGC Electronic and Cyber Centre; Handala (MOIS-linked); APT28 (GRU 26165, Forest Blizzard, Swallowtail); APT29 (SVR, Midnight Blizzard); Sandworm (GRU 74455, APT44) with UAC-0099; Turla and Static Tundra (FSB Centre 16); Gamaredon (FSB); Storm-1516; NoName057(16), Z-Pentest and CARR (pro-Russian hacktivist, Z-Pentest with documented prior state direction). Full dossier entries accompany this report.
  • Infrastructure patterns from our sensors: Proton66 (AS198953) as the dominant Russian-geolocated source of brute force; Iran Telecommunication Company (AS58224) as the dominant Iranian one; neither diagnostic of state activity.

6.3 Separating a state outage from a change-window outage

Because the question will come up again, a short checklist that an executive can apply in the first six hours of the next big outage, before any attribution is possible:

  1. Did the operator name a change? A configuration change, update, router swap or disaster-recovery exercise in the hours before failure is the single most common cause and the first thing a competent operator will say. Microsoft, the FAA, Workday, Chase and Apple all did.
  2. Is there a ransom note, a defacement, a claim or a leak? State disruption is usually accompanied by a persona claiming it within hours (Handala, CyberAv3ngers, NoName). Silence from the usual claimants is informative.
  3. Did unrelated systems fail in the same hour, or the same week? Coordinated attack produces simultaneity. Five failures across five days in five unrelated stacks is the signature of coincidence plus attention.
  4. Is there a physical effect? States that want to be felt produce one: fires, spoiled stock, false alarms. Lost email does not fit.
  5. Who is saying "attack", and what evidence do they cite? Apply the ladder. A claim without indicators is a rung-7 claim regardless of the claimant's résumé.

7. Overall assessment and what would change it

The evidence supports a narrow and specific statement, which we recommend readers adopt in preference to any broader one:

Iran is highly likely to have conducted a sabotage campaign against European commercial refrigeration in October 2026 that caused physical damage, and Iranian or pro-Russian actors are a realistic possibility behind its November extension, which reached British businesses. Russia is highly likely to have conducted espionage against NATO defence and government targets, likely to have ordered physical sabotage in Estonia and hijacked Ukraine's civil alerting app, and likely to have run deepfake influence against US elections. There is no credible evidence that either state caused the American technology and aviation outages of 12 to 17 November, which are highly likely to have had the separate, benign causes their operators have stated.

What would move these grades

  • Up for Iran on wave two: a Belgian, Dutch, Irish or UK government attribution; publication of France's indicators and an overlap with wave-two intrusions; a US Treasury designation naming individuals for the November attacks.
  • Down for Iran on wave one: credible forensic evidence that the hacktivist crews were the primary actors in France as well, which would be unprecedented at that scale but is the only serious alternative.
  • Up on the US outages: a Microsoft post-incident report or FAA root-cause statement describing tampering, or any operator revising its statement. Either would be a major event and we would expect to know within hours.
  • Up for Russia on Quantum Systems: a statement from the German federal prosecutor or BfV naming an actor; publication of the implant by the company or a vendor.
  • Up for Russia on outages in NATO Europe generally: any repeat of the December 2025 Polish grid attack. The access (edge devices, routers) is demonstrably being gathered; the decision to use it destructively outside Ukraine has so far been taken once.

Recommendations for defence, intelligence and infrastructure readers

  1. Find the fridges. Every organisation with cold storage, HVAC or building management should know today which controllers are reachable from the internet, through whose contractor, on what firmware. The French victims were not critical infrastructure; they were shops. The British victims were meat suppliers. The campaign is live and the controllers remain unpatched.
  2. Treat edge appliances as the front line. Sixteen exploited edge-device vulnerabilities in seven weeks, with state units documented using exactly this class of access, means patch cycles for VPNs, firewalls and mail gateways need to be measured in days and management interfaces must not face the internet.
  3. Pre-bunk outages. Operators should prepare the "it was a change, here is the change" statement for release within hours, because the attribution narrative will otherwise be written for them. Microsoft's 16 November cause summary is a good template; a four-day gap was long enough for a whistleblower letter and a Cabinet-level denial.
  4. Grade before you brief. Attach an evidence-ladder rung to every attribution that reaches a decision-maker. "Linked to Iran" covers rungs 1 through 7 and should be retired from briefings.
  5. Watch the proving ground. Ukraine remains where Russian destructive capability is exercised; Israel where Iranian capability is. Techniques appear there first (alert-app hijacks, wipers via edge devices, OT manipulation) and arrive in NATO Europe later. A watch on those two theatres is the cheapest early warning available.

Sources

Open sources, numbered as cited. Ninja Labz data sources are named inline. Accessed 18 November 2026.

  1. Wikipedia, "2026 Microsoft outage", citing Microsoft's cause summary (Charles Lamanna, 16 Nov), BBC, The Register, SecurityWeek, Forbes, The Guardian, CBC. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Microsoft_outage
  2. Control Plane, "What caused the Microsoft 365 outage of November 12, 2026". https://controlplane.com/blog/post/microsoft-365-outage-november-2026-cause
  3. IBTimes UK, "Cyberattacks and outages in November: the major US disruptions reported so far". https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/us-businesses-hit-cyber-incidents-outages-1832974
  4. Yahoo News / Fortune, "Mullin floated superintelligence. The FAA is blaming the hardware, switching off its new routers". https://www.yahoo.com/news/us/articles/mullin-floated-superintelligence-faa-blaming-205630800.html
  5. Fox News live blog, "Tech outages: Microsoft, banks and FAA", 17 Nov. https://www.foxnews.com/live-news/tech-outages-microsoft-banks-faa-fbi-11-17-26
  6. ABC News, "National intelligence director says no signs of cyberattack amid tech outage concerns". https://abcnews.com/US/national-intelligence-director-signs-cyberattack-amid-tech-outage/story?id=138229967
  7. Fox Business, "Jay Clayton says no cyberattack behind tech outages". https://www.foxbusiness.com/technology/jay-clayton-addresses-concerns-amid-widespread-tech-outages
  8. IBTimes UK, "'An Iranian cyber attack': whistleblower raises Russia link as US tech outages spark questions". https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/iranian-cyber-attack-whistleblower-raises-russia-link-us-tech-outages-spark-questions-1833097
  9. CNN, "Markwayne Mullin faces scrutiny as administration grapples with unsettling tech outages", 17 Nov. https://www.cnn.com/2026/11/17/politics/markwayne-mullin-faa-tech-outages
  10. Townhall, "Markwayne Mullin addresses fears of a cyberattack after a string of major US outages". https://townhall.com/news/dmitri-bolt/2026/11/17/dhs-secretary-markwayne-mullin-just-shed-some-more-light-on-the-series-of-major-tech-outages-n2686584
  11. Cybernews, "US outages not linked to cyberattacks, Rubio says". https://cybernews.com/tech/apple-outage/
  12. Wikipedia, "2026 Iran war ceasefire" and "Islamabad Talks". https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Iran_war_ceasefire
  13. Al Jazeera, "'No war, no peace': can Iran break the deadlock with the US?", 12 Nov. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/11/12/no-war-no-peace-can-iran-break-the-deadlock-with-the-us
  14. Wikipedia, "Cyberwarfare during the 2026 Iran war". https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberwarfare_during_the_2026_Iran_war
  15. The Record, "France blames Iran for fridge cyberattacks, says some caused fires", 9 Nov. https://therecord.media/france-blames-iran-for-fridge-cyberattacks
  16. The Hacker News, "France blames Iran for sabotage attack on refrigeration controllers at about 700 retail sites". https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/france-blames-iran-for-sabotage-attack.html
  17. SecurityWeek, "Over 100 European stores hit as supermarket fridge attacks resume". https://www.securityweek.com/over-100-european-stores-hit-as-supermarket-fridge-attacks-resume/
  18. The Record, "British businesses caught in Europe-wide supermarket fridge attacks". https://therecord.media/british-businesses-caught-in-europe-wide-supermarket-fridge-attacks
  19. BleepingComputer, "Cyberattack disrupts blood storage refrigeration systems in France". https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cyberattack-disrupts-blood-storage-refrigeration-systems-in-france/
  20. Cybernews, "Russian hackers claim responsibility for attacks on European refrigeration systems"; SOCRadar, "Critical infrastructure freezers"; Forescout, "Cold chain, open control". https://cybernews.com/security/russian-hackers-hacked-european-refrigeration-systems/
  21. TechCrunch, "US government warns of 'ongoing cyber threat' amid mass hacks of industrial retail and military freezers", 5 Nov. https://techcrunch.com/2026/11/05/u-s-government-warns-of-ongoing-cyber-threat-amid-mass-hacks-of-industrial-retail-and-military-freezers/
  22. Al Jazeera, "France accuses Iran of cyberattack on supermarket fridges"; NPR, "Iran denies it was behind cyber fridge attacks targeting France", 9 Nov. https://www.npr.org/2026/11/09/g-s1-152724/france-iran-cyber-sabotage-fridge-attacks
  23. Reuters via TimesLIVE, "French officials suspect Iran is behind refrigerator hacks, sources say" (Satter and Stargardter), 9 Nov. https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/world/2026-11-09-french-officials-suspect-iran-is-behind-refrigerator-hacks-sources-say/
  24. Anadolu Agency, "Belgium says cyberattacks on supermarket refrigeration systems may have Iranian links"; Arab News, "Belgium says evidence points at Iran", 13 Nov. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/belgium-says-cyberattacks-on-supermarket-refrigeration-systems-may-have-iranian-links/4122532
  25. The Hacker News, "Six unpatched Danfoss refrigeration controller flaws could allow remote takeover without login"; SecurityWeek, "Hackers probe newly disclosed flaws in Copeland refrigeration controllers". https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/six-unpatched-danfoss-refrigeration.html
  26. Industrial Cyber, "CISA, federal partners flag exposed OT controllers as cyberattacks disrupt supermarket cooling systems across Europe". https://industrialcyber.co/industrial-cyber-attacks/cisa-federal-partners-flag-exposed-ot-controllers-as-cyberattacks-disrupt-supermarket-cooling-systems-across-europe/
  27. Ninja Labz Signal graph, AlienVault OTX campaign pulses ingested 1 Oct to 18 Nov 2026 (283 records), including "European Refrigeration Systems Cyber Sabotage" (13 Nov), "The Cold Chain on Fire" (10 Nov), "A Dish Served Lukewarm" (6 Nov), "Poisoned Source" (4 Nov), "Gorbag" (3 Nov), "Belarus-Linked Hackers Deploy Wiper" (30 Oct), "MythicRatatoskr" (22 Oct), "Swallowtail" (20 Oct), "Blinder Tunnel" (7 Oct).
  28. STRIKE Team via OTX, "A Dish Served Lukewarm: the refrigerator botnet", 6 Nov.
  29. CISA, "Iranian-affiliated cyber actors exploit programmable logic controllers across US critical infrastructure", AA26-097A (7 Apr 2026, updated 22 Jul 2026). https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/260722.pdf
  30. CBS News, "At least 12 states report cyberattacks on water systems possibly linked to Iran-backed hackers"; TIME, "What to know about the US water systems cyberattacks", 2 Aug. https://time.com/article/2026/08/02/what-to-know-about-the-u-s-water-systems-cyberattacks/
  31. The Grocer, "France blames Iran for cyberattack on supermarket fridges". https://www.thegrocer.co.uk/news/france-blames-iran-for-cyberattack-on-supermarket-fridges/725736.article
  32. NPR, "Hackers target fridges in Israel, Europe and the US", 3 Nov. https://www.npr.org/2026/11/03/nx-s1-6026676/cold-war-hackers-fridges
  33. Reuters via US News, "French officials blame Iran for refrigerator hacks, vow retaliation", 9 Nov. https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2026-11-09/exclusive-french-officials-suspect-iran-is-behind-refrigerator-hacks-sources-say
  34. Wikipedia, "Handala Hack Team"; Check Point incident count via Cyber News Network briefing. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Handala_Hack_Team
  35. Microsoft, 2026 Digital Defense Report executive summary. https://cdn-dynmedia-1.microsoft.com/is/content/microsoftcorp/microsoft/msc/documents/presentations/CSR/2026-Microsoft-DDR-Exec-Summary.pdf
  36. NCSC, Annual Review 2026, "The cyber threat to the UK", and Richard Horne's launch speech, 3 Nov. https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/annual-review-2026/understanding-threat/cyber-threat-uk
  37. Kyiv Post, "Estonia foils GRU-ordered sabotage attack on drone maker Threod Systems". https://www.kyivpost.com/post/90184
  38. ERR News, "Estonia to close border crossings with Russia after GRU-linked sabotage attacks". https://news.err.ee/1610196794/estonia-to-close-border-crossings-with-russia-after-gru-linked-sabotage-attacks
  39. Euronews, "EU ministers demand united response as Russian attacks spill beyond Ukraine", 16 Nov. https://www.euronews.com/2026/11/16/eu-ministers-demand-united-response-as-russian-attacks-spill-beyond-ukraine
  40. ESET APT Activity Report Q2 to Q3 2026, 28 Oct, via Cyber News Network briefing. https://cyberwarrior76.substack.com/p/nation-state-cyber-threat-intelligence-717
  41. CBS News, "Ukraine and Russia's emergency alert apps both hacked, residents warned of fake nuclear, chemical strikes". https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-russia-war-app-hack-cyberattack-fake-nuclear-chemical-alerts/
  42. Kyiv Independent, "Zelensky confirms Ukraine targeted Russian emergency alert systems in retaliatory hack". https://kyivindependent.com/zelensky-confirms-ukraine-targeted-russian-emergency-alert-systems-in-retaliatory-hack/
  43. Kyiv Independent, 11 Nov, via Cyber News Network briefing (newsroom takeovers).
  44. Symantec Threat Hunter Team, "Swallowtail: Russian espionage group targets defense firms in two NATO countries", 20 Oct (via OTX); AhnLab ASEC, "October 2026: major APT group trends". https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/96569/
  45. Trellix CyberThreat Report, November 2026 (Zimbra targeting), via Cyber News Network briefing.
  46. Sekoia TDR, "Poisoned Source: APT29 watering holes target mobile devices", 4 Nov (via OTX); SecurityWeek, "Russia-linked hackers hit iOS, Android devices with exploit chains via watering holes". https://www.securityweek.com/russia-linked-hackers-hit-ios-android-devices-with-exploit-chains-via-watering-holes/
  47. The Romania Journal, "Russia denies role in cyberattack on Romanian institution". https://romaniajournal.ro/politics/russia-denies-role-in-cyberattack-on-romanian-institution
  48. FDD, "Russian operatives plant deepfake targeting US midterm elections", 26 Oct. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/russian-operatives-plant-deepfake-targeting-u-s-midterm-elections/
  49. NPR, "Russia steps up election influence efforts in final stretch of midterms", 23 Oct. https://www.hppr.org/npr-news/2026-10-23/russia-steps-up-election-influence-efforts-in-final-stretch-of-midterms
  50. Al Arabiya, "German drone maker supplying Ukraine reports cyberattack", 13 Nov. https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2026/11/13/german-drone-maker-supplying-ukraine-reports-cyberattack
  51. Tech Times, "Quantum Systems cyberattack: reported update server poisoning led Bundeswehr to ground drones", 16 Nov. https://www.techtimes.com/articles/330788/20261116/quantum-systems-cyberattack-reported-update-server-poisoning-led-bundeswehr-ground-drones.htm
  52. The Hacker News, "Amazon exposes years-long GRU cyber campaign targeting energy and cloud infrastructure", Dec 2025. https://thehackernews.com/2025/12/amazon-exposes-years-long-gru-cyber.html
  53. Check Point Research, "PHP2Shell exploitation on Check Point gateway"; SecurityWeek, "PHP2Shell exploited in destructive Check Point gateway attacks". https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/php2shell-exploitation-on-check-point-gateway/

Appendix: Ninja Labz data tables

A. Press series (GDELT and social press, cyber-tagged headlines), 11 to 18 November

DayCyber headlinesContaining "outage"Outage + attack wordMentioning Iran or Russia
11 Nov9431125
12 Nov816007
13 Nov6321493
14 Nov (partial ingest)111201
15 Nov602407
16 Nov848329
17 Nov934201212
18 Nov (to 13:00 UTC)22811101

B. Social chatter (Fusion harvest), 7 to 18 November

DayPostsIranRussiaRefrigerationOutageOutage + attribution
7 Nov49811200
8 Nov3,9851111650
9 Nov3,69733262810
10 Nov3,79327291920
11 Nov3,8081032630
12 Nov4,0769423210
13 Nov4,15812121218215
14 Nov3,90112142387
15 Nov4,10315503185
16 Nov4,39317294387
17 Nov4,46984258614
18 Nov (partial)2,1455121120

Platforms in November: Google Trends 21,786; Mastodon 18,416; Reddit 2,180; RSS 490; geopolitical RSS 188; Bluesky 18. The 9 November refrigeration peak is the French attribution; the Iran peak the same day.

C. Honeynet sources by country, 5 October to 18 November

CountryUnique IPs (Cowrie)Sessions (Cowrie)Unique IPs (OpenCanary, 11 to 18 Nov)Events (OpenCanary)
United States1,31921,08235163,717
China1,12912,1998935,553
South Korea5574,5453913,295
Russia5103,1101312,795
Brazil3794,96210220,284
India3673,8443077,870
Ukraine363n/an/an/a
Pakistan3466,045n/a5,445
Hong Kong23490123n/a
United Kingdom2051,0256523,024
Netherlands14028,5945651,276
Iran8619761,788

OpenCanary events by country are dominated by single scanners: France 291,545 (one address), Poland 197,554, Bulgaria 89,099. Cowrie "Netherlands" sessions are almost entirely one Azure address. Country is that of the connecting address.

D. Ninja Labz Daily and Weekly coverage of the window

  • Daily: first refrigeration story ("nothing clever: a control system on the internet"); aside on OT being in scope.
  • Daily: "Second wave of supermarket fridge attacks across Europe, and a Russian emergency-alert app sending alerts it was not asked for."
  • Daily: French blood-service refrigeration; "APT29 hijacked an analytics script, and the phone did the rest."
  • Daily: "The FBI and CISA tell critical infrastructure to go and look at the fridges." Weekly (6 Nov): TraderTraitor Actor of the Week; FBI/CISA refrigeration warning in the chatter column.
  • Daily: the refrigerator botnet (XWEB PRO controllers as spam and proxy infrastructure).
  • Daily: "France attributes the supermarket refrigeration attacks to an IRGC unit, as US agencies warn the same controllers are being targeted globally"; why it matters: "a named target set with a named adversary; find yours before the insurer does."
  • Weekly: Turla Actor of the Week (ten articles, 51 techniques); all-time tradecraft table.
  • Daily: FAA ground stop; "The FAA outage looks like a software update, which nobody wants it to be."
  • Daily: six unpatched Danfoss flaws; Optimizely supply chain; NSANet disruption listed under "nothing to see" with "no cause is given" and no link between the day's outages.

Ninja Labz is the research arm of NinjaIng Ltd (Suffolk, UK). This report was compiled on 18 November 2026 from open sources and from Ninja Labz's own sensors and graph, with drafting assistance from Claude. Numbers from our systems are reproducible from the queries recorded in the accompanying dossier. Assessments are ours. Nothing here is drawn from classified or privileged material, and the document is suitable for onward circulation under TLP:CLEAR. Corrections to [email protected]. A machine-readable dossier (actors, incidents, indicators, sources, each record tagged with its provenance) accompanies this report.

ScottG · Ninja Labz · ninjalabz.io

attributionIranIRGCShahid KavehCyberAv3ngersRussiaGRUAPT28APT29SandwormTurlaStorm-1516refrigerationcold chainDanfosscritical infrastructureoutagesMicrosoft 365FAAKEVhoneynetdefence

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